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Adjustable rate and hybrid loans have been a large and important component of 
subprime lending in the mortgage market.  While maintaining the familiar 30-year term 
the typical adjustable rate loan in subprime is designed as a hybrid of fixed and adjustable 
characteristics.  In its most prevalent form, the first two years are typically fixed and the 
remaining 28 years adjustable.  Perhaps not surprisingly, using a competing risks 
proportional hazard framework that also accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, hybrid 
loans are sensitive to rising interest rates and tend to temporarily terminate at much 
higher rates when the loan transforms into an adjustable rate.  However, these 
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The mortgage market continues to evolve and provide more access to credit for home 
purchase, rate-driven refinancing, and equity extraction-driven refinancing.  For example, 
mortgage debt dwarfed consumer debt by fourfold in the first quarter of 2005 according 
to the American Bankers Association (ABA).  Part of this growth can be attributed to the 
proliferation of nontraditional mortgage products such as interest-only loans and loans 
with little or no documentation of down payment sources or income.  In addition, the 
growth of the subprime mortgage market has helped introduce credit constrained 
households to the mortgage debt market. 
 
Since the introduction of Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM) in the early 1980s, however, 
recent ARM market shares in the conventional conforming prime market have been fairly 
modest (10 to 30  percent from 2003 through 2005) (Fannie Mae 2006).  In contrast, the 
ARM market share for securitized subprime loans has ranged from just approximately 60 
percent to over 80 percent over the same time period.  In addition, ARMs are also equally 
popular products in the jumbo
1 market (Nothaft 2003). 
 
The typical ARM product in subprime is not the traditional one-year ARM indexed to 
Treasury bill yields.   Instead, a hybrid product that mixes fixed and adjustable attributes 
dominates the market place.  For example, the ABA reports that two thirds of adjustable 
rate purchase loans were 2/28 hybrids.  The 2 indicates that the first 2 years of the loan 
                                                 
1 Jumbo loans are loans whose loan amount is greater than the conforming loan limit imposed on Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.  The loan limit is updated annually by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. 
  1have a fixed interest rate, while the 28 indicates that the remaining 28 years of the loan 
have an adjustable interest rate.  Loan Performance data indicate that almost all 2/28 
hybrids adjust every six months and are indexed to the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR).
2     
 
To the authors’ knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical examination of the 
performance of 2/28 hybrid mortgages in the subprime market.  A competing risk 
framework is employed that allows for the dependence of the two types of termination 
(default and prepayment) and controls for unobserved heterogeneity without assuming a 
shape to the unobserved distribution.  In addition, a large national data set of loans 
originated from 1998-2005 is used that includes loans backed by real estate and 
securitized in the asset-backed securities market by private firms (private label).  The 
performance of subprime 30-year hybrid loans is compared with concurrently originated 
subprime 30-year fixed rate loans.  
Literature on Adjustable and Hybrid Rate Loans 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature on the termination of mortgages through 
prepayment and default has been well developed and we will not dwell on it in this paper.    
Instead we will extend the empirical literature by examining hybrid performance in the 
securitized potion of the subprime market. 
 
                                                 
2 London Interbank Offered Rate (or LIBOR) is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at which 
banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the London wholesale (or "interbank") money market. 
 
  2ARMs provide unique benefits and costs from both the borrower and the lender’s 
perspective.  Unlike Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRMs), ARMs potentially impose payment 
shocks on the borrower as interest rates increase.  On the other hand, if interest rates 
decrease, at the prescribed adjustment date, the borrower will automatically benefit from 
a lower payment.
3  In other words, the borrower using an ARM takes on interest rate risk 
that the lender usually faces when originating or investing in a fixed rate product.  In 
terms of pricing lenders provide lower initial interest rates to compensate the borrower 
for bearing more of the interest rate risk (Bruekner 1986; Sa-Aadu and Sirmans 1989).  In 
practice there is continuum of interest rate risk sharing.  For example, caps and floors on 
how much rates can change over the life of the mortgage or in each adjustment period can 
be used to shield the borrower from large or fast adjustments in underlying interest rates.  
Therefore, while holding lender-expected returns constant, the more interest rate risk the 
borrower takes on, the lower the expected cost for the borrowing should be.  This feature 
can make ARMs more affordable and easier to qualify for than FRMs.  Many ARMs also 
have initial interest rates that are below the fully indexed rate (the teaser rate).  Therefore, 
even if the index is constant through time, the interest rate and monthly payment paid by 
the ARM borrower using a teaser will increase until the rate is fully adjusted (index plus 
the margin or spread). 
 
There is evidence that under asymmetric information a separating equilibrium exists 
where high-risk borrowers choose to finance using an ARM (Posey and Yavas 2001).  
Therefore, it should not be surprising that the subprime market is associated with much 
                                                 
3 This benefit or cost will be realized only to the extent that the underlying index changes through time and 
the interest rate is reset. 
  3higher rates of ARM usage than the conventional prime market.  It is also widely 
believed that borrowers who expect to move or prepay their mortgage in the near future 
are likely to self-select into ARMs (Bruekner 1986; Bruekner and Follain 1988; Dhillon, 
Shilling, and Sirmans 1987).  Given the structure of the hybrid mortgage and the low 
costs of refinancing, hybrid borrowers may plan to refinance at the end of the fixed rate 
period to avoid the impact of teasers or higher interest rates on the required monthly 
payment.  Consistent with these issues, our estimation data set (discussed below) 
indicates that on average hybrid borrowers have lower credit scores, provide a smaller 
down payment, and are more likely to have a prepayment penalty on the loan.  In 
addition, on average hybrid loans terminate through both default and prepayment at 
elevated rates.  It will be an empirical question as to whether these observed differences 
are explained by borrower and location characteristics or reflect a unique hybrid specific 
termination profile. 
 
There is a fairly substantial empirical literature on the termination of ARMs.  In general, 
the traditional ARM seems to respond in a similar fashion to the economic and financial 
incentives to default or prepay a mortgage.  For example, default is more likely when 
there is negative or low equity in a home and prepayments are more likely when 
prevailing interest on mortgages have declined.  However, there is some mixed evidence 
on the impact of teaser rates and other ARM-specific terms on terminations (Ambrose 
and LaCour-Little 2001; Calhoun and Deng 2002; Green and Shilling 1997; Vanderhoff 
1996; Bruekner and Follain 1988; Cunningham and Capone 1990).  In the paper most 
similar to our own, Amborse, LaCour-Little, and Huszar (2005) examine the performance 
  4of 3/27 hybrid loans from one lender using a sample of 181 observed defaults on over 
2,000 loans originated in 1995 and 1996.  They find that the time period when the loan 
converts from a fixed to an adjustable rate is associated with a substantial and permanent 
increase in the conditional hazard of default and with a substantial but temporary increase 
in the conditional hazard of prepayment.   
 
Our following empirical investigation contributes to the literature by (1) including a 
much larger sample of hybrids, (2) providing direct comparisons with concurrently 
originated FRMs, (3) including many lenders,  (4) covering the subprime market, and (5) 
using more recent data.  
 
Competing Risks Estimation with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
A loan can terminate through either default or prepayment – two options that compete 
with each other to be the first observed event.  We jointly model the probability of default 
and prepayment in a competing risks proportional hazard framework that also accounts 
for the unobserved factors that influence the termination of the mortgages.  We employ 
the empirical approach used by Yu (2006), who investigates bank bankruptcy and 
mergers.  This method is based on the work by Han and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi 
(1992), and McCall (1996).   
 
Let TD, TP, and TC be the duration to default, prepayment, and the end of the sample 
period (censored), respectively.  For a mortgage j with j=1,…,N the first realized 
termination time is observed, Tj=min{TP,TD,TC}.  To explain the termination history of 
the loans, we control for both observed heterogeneity X(t), which can be time-constant or 
  5time-variant, and unobserved heterogeneity (ΘD, ΘP), which has the joint density g(θD, 
θP) and is assumed to be independent of X(t).  The dependence between the two risks 
(default and prepay) conditioning on X is related directly to the distribution of the 
unobserved characteristics -- that is, the correlation of the unobserved heterogeneity 
parameters.   
 
The cause-specific hazard function (the probability of termination at time t conditioned 
on survival to time t) is defined as 
t
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where r=D, P and  denotes the baseline hazard for risk r.  The loan subscript j has 
been dropped for convenience.  We investigate two possible forms of the baseline hazard 
functions.  In the polynomial form, the baseline is parameterized as a quadratic function 
of the loan age:   (for identification purpose   is fixed at 0).  
Alternatively, the shape of the baseline might be imposed by employing a standard such 
as the “PSA experience” and shifting the PSA up or down to match the observed level of 
terminations in the subprime mortgage market.
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4 The Public Securities Association (PSA) has attempted to standardize market assumptions about the 
pattern of mortgage default and prepayments, with terminations assumed to occur at some chosen multiple 
of the standard path.  By the standard default assumption, 100% SDA assumes a linear rise from 0% to 
0.6% for the first 30 months, constant at peak value for the next 30 months, linear decline to 0.03% over 
the next 60 months, and constant at 0.03% for remaining life.  By the standard prepayment model, 100% 
  6 
Since the outcomes are assumed to be independent of each other when conditioning on 
observed and unobserved characteristics, the conditional survival function is defined as: 
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If we denote the indicator variables for termination by default ID and prepay IP, then a 
typical loan j has the following likelihood function: 
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Since termination and mortgage payments occur at discrete intervals of the same length 
(monthly frequency), we make the assumption that the time-varying covariates X(t) are 
constant within each interval.  In other words, if there are T* potential termination times, 
then X(t - ∆) = X(t), 0 < ∆ < 1, t = 1,…,T*.  As noted by Sueyoshi (1992), this is a natural 
assumption given the inherent discreteness of sampling and the lack of a priori 
knowledge about the evolution of the covariates over time.  Under this condition (5) is 
reduced to 
                                                                                                                                                 
PSA assumes (1) a linear rise from 0% to 6% for the first 30 month and (2) a constant rate at 6% for 
remaining life.  These rates are annualized.  
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For estimation purpose we assume that the unobserved heterogeneities follow a discrete 
probability distribution with M points of support (or mass points), pm, where∑ .  
The approach estimates the size of M distinct groups of loans with distinct probabilities 
of default and prepay.  Further, following Dong and Koppelman (2003) and Yu (2006), to 
ensure that the probabilities lie within [0, 1] and sum up to 1, we use a logistic 
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where -∞ < qm < ∞ and q1 is normalized to 0.
5
Data  
Our empirical analysis investigates the performance of FRM and hybrid mortgages to 
determine whether and how they respond differently to mortgage characteristics and 
time-varying financial and economic incentives to terminate the loan.  Data are from the 
LoanPerformance Asset Backed Securities loan-level database and represent only the 
securitized portion of the subprime market.  The loans included in our data sets are 
originated between 1998 and 2005, and performance is followed monthly for up to eight 
years until the end of 2005.  Besides end-of-sample censoring, the data are also left-
censored in the sense that loans are often allowed to season for various amounts of time 
before becoming part of the securities pool.  To facilitate the estimation of the hazard 
                                                 
5 The likelihood function is defined and maximized in SAS/OR 9.1 for Windows in Proc NLP.  While the 
data is proprietary, the code is available on request from the authors. 
  8functions we limit our samples to the 2-month seasoned loans only.  The FRM sample 
consists of over 72,000 30-year fixed rate single-family mortgages (purchases and 
refinances), and the ARM sample includes over 101,000 2/28 hybrid loans.
6  The 2/28 
hybrid instruments make up the majority of the adjustable rate mortgage universe, 
averaging over 68 percent of all ARMs in our data between 1998 and 2005.  
 
To help describe the data and differences between hybrids and FRMs, we conducted a 
preliminary analysis of our sample data using the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier 
estimators.  The Kaplan-Meier method has the advantage that it can account for right-
censored data.  Specifically, we estimate the Kaplan-Meier cause-specific hazard 
functions (Figures 1 and 2), the cumulative default and prepay functions (Figure 3), and 
the survival function (Figure 4) for both hybrid and fixed rate loans by loan age.
7  A loan 
is considered to default if it becomes “Real Estate Owned (REO)” property or if 
foreclosure proceedings are initiated.  A loan is prepaid when the balance becomes zero 
and in the prior month the loan was either current or delinquent.  We focus on the first 60 
months because, as the loans get older, there are fewer observations and the censorship 
problem also becomes more severe, making the estimates less reliable.  The figures show 
                                                 
6 Rates are fixed for the first 2 years and adjustable every 6 months and indexed to the 6-month LIBOR for 
the next 28 years.  Approximately 99% of the 2/28 ARMs have a rate reset frequency of 6 months and are 
indexed to the 6-month LIBOR, so we focus on this dominant type.  
7 Assuming hazards occur at discrete times, tj = t0 + j*∆ with j = 1,…,J.  Define the number of loans “at 
risk” at time tj, nj, to be those that have reached the time point tj without being censored or terminated.  
Define drj to be the number of terminations due to cause r at time point tj.  The Kaplan-Meier estimate of 
the hazard function and the survival function are 
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  9that for our loan samples, the 2/28 hybrids tended to default more than the 30-year fixed 
rate mortgages, with the monthly default rate reaching a peak of 1.5 percent at around the 
30
th month.  About 10 percent of FRMs (20 percent of hybrids) have defaulted five years 
after origination.  Hybrids prepaid much faster than FRMs during the two-year period 
after the first adjustment date (25
th month).  In fact, the peak conditional monthly hazard 
of prepayment is above 12 percent in the first month that the loans change over to 
adjustable rates.   Approximately 20 percent of hybrids survived after three years while 
40 percent of FRMs survived.  In the following sections we will incorporate explanatory 
variables in a competing risks analysis to better understand the default and prepay 
patterns of adjustable and fixed rate mortgages.  
 
To estimate the conditional monthly default and prepay probabilities specified in 
equation (2) for hybrid and fixed rate loans, we include various mortgage and market 
characteristics as our covariates.  Table 1 describes the variables and Table 2 provides 
some summary statistics for our estimation samples.  Due to the different nature of the 
fixed and adjustable rate mortgage contracts we use a different set of covariates for each 
loan product.   
 
The mortgage variables common to the two models are borrower’s credit score at 
origination, fico, the current loan-to-value ratio, cltv, and indicators of loan 
documentation and prepayment penalty status, lndoc and ppen.  The FICO score 
measures the consumer’s ability to meet prior financial obligations, and therefore 
borrowers with higher credit scores are expected to default less often.  However, the 
  10relationship between credit scores and the likelihood of prepayment is unclear.  The fixed 
rate loans in our sample have a higher average FICO score (664) than the adjustable rate 
loans (603). Given these loans are included in ABS securities, the market has treated 
them as not-prime or subprime loans.  It appears that the securitized FRM subprime 
represents the better or A- segment of the subprime market.  In contrast, the FICO scores 
on the ARM loans are low enough that these loans are most likely to represent the higher 
cost segments such as the B&C segment of subprime.  The current loan-to-value ratio, 
cltv, is calculated using the reported outstanding loan balance in each month and the 
house value updated by the OFHEO metropolitan area house price index.
8  This variable 
measures the equity position of the borrower and can be a strong predictor of both default 
and prepay probabilities.  When a loan is in low or negative equity (higher cltv), it is 
often “in the money” to default and put the mortgage back to the lender or investor.  On 
the other hand, substantial positive equity compensates for other risks such as weak credit 
history, making it easier to refinance the mortgage.  In our samples, the hybrid loans have 
slightly higher loan-to-value ratio than the fixed rate loans (78 percent vs. 73 percent).            
 
About 19 percent of the hybrids in the sample provided limited or no documentation 
(lndoc) of income or down payment sources.  In contrast, the figure is twice as high for 
the FRMs.  Lack of documentation may indicate additional risks associated with future 
incomes and thus is expected to increase default probabilities.  In addition, in 40 percent 
of fixed rate loan-months there is a prepayment penalty in effect (ppen), compared with 
                                                 
8 Other studies have created a variable representing the probability that the home is in negative equity.  
However, the parameters necessary to calculate this variable are available to the public only at the state 
level.  We prefer to use the metropolitan area index to more accurately reflect local market conditions and 
include an additional volatility measure of the index itself. 
  11almost 70 percent for hybrid rate loans.  These penalties make it more costly to prepay a 
mortgage, thus in their presence the prepayment probabilities should be lower.  
Prepayment penalties have also been found to increase default probabilities (Quercia, 
Stegman and Davis 2005), possibly because they increase the cost of prepaying relative 
to default when a loan becomes delinquent.       
 
In the fixed rate model we include refi, a variable that measures the extent that it is “in 
the money” to refinance a fixed rate mortgage.  For each borrower j in each month t, the 
call option is calculated as the percentage reduction in the present value of future 
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Thus we expect prepayment probability for fixed rate loans to increase when the value of 
the prepayment option (refi) is large.   
 
In the adjustable rate model we follow Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar (2005) and 
define a series of variables that might influence the default and prepay probabilities of the 
2/28 hybrid loans.  One factor likely to induce default or prepayment is the payment 
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O j i j P .  For PVjc (current mortgage), O is the 
original balance, TM is the remaining term on the mortgage, and i is the contract interest rate.  For PVjr 
(refinanced mortgage), O becomes the unpaid balance on the loan, TM is the remaining term, and i is the 
market rate as defined by the Freddie Mac PMMS for that month, adjusted up by the fraction that the 
borrower’s contract rate was above the prime rate at origination to reflect credit impairment.  
  12shock (pmtshock) faced by the borrower at each interest rate adjustment date.  Payment 
shocks can be caused by the loan having a teaser/discount during the fixed rate period 
(where initial rate is below the fully indexed rate) or by an increase in the value of the 
index (the 6-month LIBOR) since the last adjustment.  Specifically, for each loan j in 
















pmtshock .                 (9) 
Thus, pmtshock is the percentage increase in the monthly payment (PMT) relative to that 
in the previous adjustment period (negative values are set to zero).  The variable is zero 
for the first 24 months since rate is fixed, and it is constant within an adjustment period.  
The interest rate used to calculate payment in each adjustment period is based on the 
current index value, the margin, and any binding periodic or lifetime interest rate caps or 
floors on the mortgage.  This variable captures the impact of all of these features on loan 
performance.  We expect to see higher probabilities of prepayment during periods with 
positive and large payment shocks as borrowers look for alternative loans to lower or 
stabilize their monthly payments.  High payment shocks might also induce default as it is 
now more difficult for the borrower to make timely payments.   
 
We also include adjust, a dummy variable denoting the 3-month window surrounding the 
first adjustment date (months 24, 25, 26) and aftadj, a dummy variable indicating month 
27 forwards.  It is expected that the probabilities of default and prepay for an ARM will 
shift up during the rate adjustment window.  In addition, to test the impact of payment 
shocks in different scenarios we define shock_adj as a dummy variable indicating large 
payment shocks (>5 percent) at the adjustment window, and shock_equity as a dummy 
  13variable indicating large payment shocks (>5 percent) coupled with low equity (cltv>90 
percent).  Option theory indicates that payment shocks associated with low or negative 
equity should be more strongly associated with defaults than shocks with large amounts 
of equity.  However, lender forbearance and the use of short sales (sale price less than 
outstanding balance on loan) may temper this expected impact.  
 
Several market variables are tested in both FRM and hybrid models: the metropolitan 
area unemployment rate (unemp), and house price and interest rate volatility (varhpi and 
varint/varindex).  Higher unemployment rates proxy for labor market conditions and the 
chance that the borrower will be unemployed.  Therefore, we should expect higher 
probabilities of default when unemployment rates are high.  As indicated by option 
theory, the volatility proxies are included to measure the extent that it makes sense to 
delay entering default or prepayment even if it is in the money to do so in the current 
period (Kau and Kim 1994).  In particular, if house prices are volatile it may make sense 
to wait to see if the value of the option increases in the future (larger negative equity).  
The same logic applies to interest rates.  If interest rates are volatile it may make sense to 
wait for it to become more deeply in the money in the future to refinance.  To measure 
the volatility of interest rates the 6-month LIBOR (the index) is used for hybrids and 1-
year Treasury yields for FRMs.  Lastly, in the hybrid model we include a measure of the 
spread between the prevailing 30-year fixed rate and the prevailing 1-year ARM rate 
(spread) to proxy for the benefits of shifting from an ARM to an FRM.  
  14Results 
The results largely meet expectations in terms of statistical significance and coefficient 
signs.  In terms of the traditional risk drivers (equity, interest rates, and credit scores) 
both hybrids and FRMs react in the same direction, although with different magnitudes.  
The most striking difference between hybrids and FRMs occurs during the first rate 
adjustment period when the loan converts from a fixed rate to an adjustable rate.  In this 
period both defaults and prepayments are elevated even without any payment shock. 
 
Tables 3 through 6 report the estimated coefficients for four different specifications.  
Specifications I and III do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity, while II and IV do.  
Specifications I and II estimate a parametric (quadratic) baseline, while III and IV include 
a proportionally shifted PSA baseline. In general, coefficient estimates are sensitive to the 
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity parameters but are very similar in both baseline 
specifications.  The variable that measures the extent that a change in interest rates 
increases monthly payments (pmtshock) is especially sensitive to unobserved 
characteristics.  This result may be because the explanatory variables do not include 
important borrower-specific variables such as the amount of debt and wealth available to 
soften the impact of payment shocks. One drawback of the quadratic baseline is that it 
relies on an increasingly small sample of defaulted loans as the loans get older.  This 
shrinking data set is not due to right censoring but instead due to the very low survivor 
rate, as previously shown using the Kaplan-Meier hazards, of subprime loans.  Therefore, 
we will focus on the estimates using the PSA baseline. 
 
  15The unobserved parameter estimates are all significant at the 5 percent level or higher and 
show substantial unobserved heterogeneity in default and prepayment for both hybrid and 
fixed rate specifications.  However, the organization of the loans into low and high 
default and prepayment groups differs across the two loan types.  For the FRMs the 
majority (76 percent) of loans are in the high default and high prepayment groups.  For 
the hybrids the majority of loans (64 percent) are in the high default and low prepayment 
groups.  This indicates that unobserved loan and borrower characteristics may be 
different in the hybrid and fixed rate environments.  In addition, note that the location 
parameter estimates (θ ’s) are positive using the PSA baseline.  This indicates that the 
PSA baseline is being proportionally shifted up for all loan groups and reflects the high 
termination rates of subprime loans. 
The Baseline of Hybrid and Fixed Rate Loans 
Figures 5 and 6 provide a graphical representation of the PSA baselines using conditional 
monthly probability estimates.  Figure 5 represents the estimated baselines for the 
average fixed and the average hybrid loan as the loan ages.  For FRMs as the loan ages 
the probability of default increases to a high of 0.43 percent and the probability of 
prepayment increases to a high of 5.04 percent.  Both of these are multiples of the 
standard PSA (0.05 percent for default and 0.50 percent for prepayment).  In terms of 
default, the hybrids have a substantially higher probability of default regardless of the age 
of the loan.  In terms of prepayment it is not until the adjustment period when the rate 
shifts from fixed to adjustable that hybrid prepayment probabilities are substantially 
higher than those of FRMs (almost 6 percent relative to 4.5 percent).  However, after the 
adjustment period the probability of prepayment for the hybrids drops substantially below 
  16the FRM level.  Figure 6 controls for borrower and loan characteristics by using the 
characteristics of the average hybrid on the FRM coefficient estimates.  After this 
adjustment, in terms of default probabilities the difference between the hybrid and FRM 
is greatly diminished.  Hybrid default probabilities do increase a little faster in the first 
two years, but after the first adjustment time period the default baseline for the hybrid and 
FRM are very similar.  In terms of prepayment the hybrid probabilities do increase faster 
during the first two years and increase substantially during the adjustment period.  
However, after the adjustment period the hybrids prepay at a lower rate for the rest of the 
life of the loan.   Figure 7 plots this information from a cumulative perspective.  The 
figure emphasizes that there is very little difference between hybrid and FRM default 
baselines.  In fact, at the end of five years almost exactly 18 percent of the loans have 
defaulted and almost 70 percent of loans have prepaid regardless of loan type.  The major 
difference is that the hybrids tend to prepay earlier (before and during the first rate 
adjustment).   
 
Perhaps surprisingly, estimates of baseline cumulative termination rates using hybrid 
prime loans are very similar to the subprime termination rates.  For example, Ambrose, 
LaCour-Little, and Huszar (2005) estimated that after 5 years just over 70 percent of the 
loans had prepaid and approximately 25 percent had defaulted.   However, in contrast to 
our results they found that after the conversion (first adjustment time period) default 
probabilities were elevated and prepayments returned to their parametric baseline hazard.  
 
  17Figure 5 through 7 are driven by the variables adjust, which measures the impact of the 
first adjustment time period when the loan changes from fixed to adjustable rates, and 
aftadj, which controls for the remaining time period when the loan is an ARM.  All other 
variables were evaluated at their means.  This implies that the baselines shown assume 
that interest rates are essentially constant and as a result there is no payment shock when 
the rate adjusts.  The coefficient estimates and the elasticity estimates in Tables 7 and 8 
indicate that the termination of hybrid loans is also sensitive to the size of the payment 
shock.  In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in the payment shock is associated 
with a 48.9 percent increase in the probability of prepaying and a 23.6 percent increase in 
the probability of default.  This is strong evidence that in rising rate environments even 
more subprime borrowers try to find an alternative mortgagee; and, if they do not, the 
likelihood of default is also elevated.  
 
Figures 8 and 9 focus on the first adjustment time period and introduce a large payment 
shock (greater than 5 percent increase) during the adjustment period when the borrower 
has a good proportion of equity in the home (shock_adj) and when the borrower has little 
equity in the home (shock_equity).  The monthly conditional probabilities are normalized 
to 1 in month 23 and then followed until the 36
th month of the loans life.  Figures 8 and 9 
also assume that the second adjustment period, which starts in month 31, has no payment 
shock (interest rates are held constant from month 25 forward in time).  Reflecting the 
impact of adjust and aftadj, if there is no payment shock in the first adjustment period 
both defaults and prepayments are elevated temporarily before returning to a slightly 
lower level.  However, contrary to the impact of large payment shocks in later adjustment 
  18periods, if there is a big payment shock during the first adjustment period as reflected by 
shock_adj both defaults and prepayments are depressed for a few months, but are slightly 
elevated for the next four months.  However, if the big shock happens to a borrower with 
low equity (shock_equity) in the home the depressing effect in the first few months is 
lessened and the rise in termination in the last four months of the first adjustment period 
are substantially elevated.  In fact, the probability of default and prepayment is more than 
twice as high relative to month 23.  Therefore, it is the classic combination of the 
borrower not having enough equity on the home in conjunction with a trigger event that 
can dramatically increase the termination of hybrid loans.  The only difference for the 
hybrid, as compared with the FRM, is that the trigger event is designed into the contract 
and is contingent on the path of future interest rates. 
Other Covariates – X(t) 
This section discusses the impact of the non-baseline related variables on the termination 
of hybrid and fixed rate loans.  The discussion focuses on Tables 7 and 8, which provide 
standardized elasticity estimates based on one-standard-deviation increases of continuous 
variables and increases from 0 to 1 for dummy variables while holding all other variables 
at their means. 
 
Consistent with prior literature on mortgage performance, higher credit scores at 
origination are associated with large decreases in the probability of default and modest 
increases in the probability of prepaying.  However, the magnitude of the response in 
terms of default is much smaller for the hybrid loans (-32 percent for hybrids versus -53 
percent for FRMs).  Again, consistent with prior empirical literature, the amount of 
  19equity in the home strongly impacts both the probability of default and prepayment.  
Loans with low or negative equity are much more likely to default and substantially less 
likely to prepay.  However, as shown in Figure 10, hybrids are less sensitive to this 
impact in terms of defaulting and more sensitive to this impact in terms of prepaying.  In 
addition, rising interest rates are associated with lower probabilities of prepayment.  Also, 
as expected, low documentation is associated with higher probabilities of default and 
prepayment penalties are associated with lower probabilities of prepayment.  The impact 
of unemployment rates is fairly small or statistically insignificant. 
 
Variables measuring the impact of the volatility of interest rates and house prices also 
meet expectations and are consistent with options theory (volatility leads to delaying 
exercising an option).  For example, when house prices are more volatile the probability 
of default declines when interest rates are volatile, as measured using LIBOR or Treasury 
bills, and the probability of prepaying is slightly retarded.   
Conclusion 
The theories of mortgage selection and pricing suggests that high-risk borrowers who 
expect to move or refinance their mortgage will self select into using adjustable rate 
mortgages.  This paper finds strong empirical evidence supporting these theories.  First, 
adjustable rate loans are much more prevalent in the subprime market, where by 
definition borrowers are more high-risk.  In addition, the credit scores for hybrid loans 
are substantially lower than for fixed rate loans on average (602 versus 664), even within 
subprime.  Also consistent with self-selection, the profile of hybrid terminations through 
default becomes much more similar to fixed rate terminations after controlling for credit 
  20scores, down payments, and economic conditions.  Second, we find strong evidence that 
subprime loans do terminate quickly.  For example, Kaplan-Meier estimates indicate that 
by two years (two and a half years) the majority of subprime hybrid rate loans (fixed rate 
loans) have terminated.  However, competing risk results indicate that by the end of five 
years in a neutral rate environment both fixed and the hybrid loans will be approximately 
70 percent terminated, which is very similar to hybrid estimates in the prime market.   
 
The most prevalent type of adjustable rate loans in subprime is the hybrid loan, which 
mixes fixed rate characteristics with adjustable rate characteristics.  For example, 
typically the rate in the first 2 years is fixed and the rate in the remaining 28 (2/28 hybrid) 
is adjustable, with a rate reset every six months indexed to LIBOR.  In a market where 
transaction costs are low and an environment where the best outcome for the borrower is 
to get out of the loan as fast as possible, the 2/28 hybrid is a natural medium or even 
short-term loan that helps to keep payments low for a few years.  After a few years the 
borrower can refinance into another loan, which could be another hybrid or even a prime 
loan.  Therefore, it should be no surprise over the first 2 years of the 2/28 hybrid that the 
loans default and prepay more often than fixed rate loans even after controlling for key 
characteristics such as down payments and credit scores.  Moreover, the time period 
when the loan converts from a fixed to adjustable rate is associated with a dramatic and 
temporary increase in prepayments and a modest and temporary increase in defaults.  
However, for those loans that survive past this first adjustment period, the baseline 
termination probabilities for the 2/28 hybrids are actually lower than the termination 
probabilities for similar subprime fixed rate loans. 
  21 
While the baselines reveal the unique termination profile of the hybrids, it does not 
include the impact of any rising interest rates.  By design hybrids subject borrowers to 
payment shocks when interest rates rise or when an initial rate teaser is phased out.  
Hybrids are sensitive to these payment shocks.  The competing risks model results 
indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the size of the shock is associated with 
an almost 50 percent increase in the probability of prepaying and more than a 25 percent 
increase in the probability of defaulting.  As a result, in an increasing interest rate 
environment we should expect to see elevated rates of default and prepayment in the 
subprime mortgage market. 
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  24Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
age  Age of loans from origination (in months) 
fico  Fair Isaac credit score  
cltv  Current loan-to-value ratio (time-varying) 
lndoc  Dummy indicating borrower provides low or no documentation 
ppen  Dummy indicating prepayment penalty in effect (time varying) 
refi  Percentage reduction in monthly payment if refinance (refinance “in the money”) 
pmtshock  Percentage increase in monthly payment between periodic adjustment periods 
adjust  Dummy indicating 3-month window around ARM adjustment date (months 24, 25, 26) 
aftadj  Dummy indicating after adjustment date (month 27 onward) 
shock_adj  Dummy indicating big payment shock (>5 percent) at months 24, 25, 26 
shock_equity  Dummy indicating big payment shock (>5 percent) and low equity (cltv>90 percent) 
spread  Percentage spread between prevailing 1-year ARM (fully-indexed) rate and 30-year fixed 
rate 
unemp  Metropolitan area unemployment rate, lagged one month 
varint  Standard deviation in 1-year Treasury bill rate for previous 15 months 
varindex  Standard deviation in 6-month LIBOR rate for previous 24 months 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Samples 
   FRM Hybrid  2/28 
Variable  Mean Std.  dev. Mean Std.  dev 
age  18.8 14.6 15.0 11.6 
fico  664.2 69.6 602.6 49.7 
cltv  73.1 15.7 78.2 12.4 
lndoc  0.396 0.489 0.193 0.395 
ppen  0.406 0.491 0.692 0.462 
refi  0.048 0.064  --  -- 
pmtshock  -- --  0.005  0.044 
adjust  -- --  0.051  0.220 
aftadj  -- --  0.132  0.338 
shock_adj  -- --  0.029  0.168 
shock_equity  -- --  0.002  0.041 
spread  -- --  -0.109  0.176 
unemp  5.159 1.638 5.201 1.482 
varint  0.512 0.280  --  -- 
varindex  -- --  0.763  0.465 
varhpi  0.295 0.196 0.271 0.188 
Sample size  72,296  101,902 
Note: During the estimation, the continuous variables are 
normalized (mean 0, standard deviation 1). 
  25Table 3: Results for Fixed Rate 30-Year Loans – Default 
   Polynomial baseline  PSA baseline 










Parameter Coef.  Std.  Err.  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
fico  -0.75 0.02  -0.83 0.02  -0.75 0.02  -0.76 0.02 
cltv  0.51 0.02 0.53 0.02 0.55 0.02 0.51 0.02 
lndoc  0.31 0.04 0.38 0.04 0.33 0.04 0.32 0.04 
ppen  0.10 0.03  -0.06 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.03 
refi  0.12 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.01 
unemp  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
varint  0.07 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 
varhpi  -0.09 0.02  -0.07 0.02  -0.09 0.02  -0.09 0.02 
1 α   0.78  0.02  1.42  0.04  -- --  -- -- 
2 α   -0.24  0.01  -0.28  0.01  -- --  -- -- 
1 θ   -6.28 0.03  -7.67 0.10 1.85 0.03 1.70 0.04 
2 θ   --  --  -5.17 0.04 --  --  2.62 0.10 
q1  --  --  0.00   --  --  0.00  
q2  --  --  -0.13 0.02 --  --  -1.14 0.05 
# loans  72,296 72,296 72,296 72,296 
Log Likelihood  -200,910 -200,382 -200,121 -199,494 
Note:  1 α  and  2 α  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.   1 θ  and  2 θ  are 
heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass 
point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.47 
(0.24) and p2=0.53 (0.76) for polynomial (PSA) baseline specification.
  26Table 4: Results for Fixed Rate 30-Year Loans – Prepay 
   Polynomial baseline  PSA baseline 










Parameter Coef.  Std.  Err.  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
fico  0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 
cltv  -0.09 0.01  -0.15 0.01  -0.02 0.01  -0.12 0.01 
lndoc  0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ppen  -0.36 0.01  -0.55 0.02  -0.35 0.01  -0.50 0.02 
refi  0.12 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.00 
unemp  0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 
varint  -0.02 0.01  -0.04 0.01  -0.05 0.01  -0.03 0.01 
varhpi  0.14 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.01 
1 α   0.49  0.01  1.12  0.02  -- --  -- -- 
2 α   -0.12  0.00  -0.19  0.01  -- --  -- -- 
1 θ   -3.75 0.01  -4.94 0.03 2.09 0.01 1.75 0.02 
2 θ   --  --  -2.57 0.03 --  --  3.45 0.03 
q1  --  --  0.00  --  --  0.00  
q2  --  --  -0.13 0.02 --  --  -1.14 0.05 
# loans  72,296 72,296 72,296 72,296 
Log Likelihood  -200,910 -200,382 -200,121 -199,494 
Note:  1 α  and  2 α  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.   1 θ  and  2 θ  are 
heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass 
point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.47 
(0.24) and p2=0.53 (0.76) for polynomial (PSA) baseline specification.
  27Table 5: Results for Hybrid 2/28 Rate Loans – Default 
   Polynomial baseline  PSA baseline 










Parameter Coef.  Std.  Err.  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
fico  -0.37 0.01  -0.38 0.01  -0.37 0.01  -0.39 0.01 
cltv  0.22 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.26 0.01 
lndoc  0.35 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.35 0.03 0.37 0.03 
ppen  0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.03 
pmtshock  0.01 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.02 
adjust  -0.02 0.05  -0.10 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.05 
aftadj  -0.35 0.04  -0.58 0.05  -0.10 0.03  -0.37 0.03 
shock_adj  -0.96 0.08  -1.27 0.08  -0.94 0.08  -1.18 0.08 
shock_equity  0.81 0.13 0.64 0.13 0.79 0.13 0.64 0.13 
spread  0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 
unemp  -0.02 0.01  -0.02 0.01  -0.02 0.01  -0.02 0.01 
varindex  0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 
varhpi  -0.12 0.01  -0.12 0.01  -0.12 0.01  -0.13 0.01 
1 α   1.03  0.02  1.09  0.03  -- --  -- -- 
2 α   -0.23  0.01  -0.21  0.01  -- --  -- -- 
1 θ   -5.20 0.02  -4.97 0.06 3.14 0.02 2.58 0.12 
2 θ   --  --  -5.46 0.11 --  --  3.57 0.05 
q1  --  --  0.00  --  --  0.00  
q2  --  --  -0.67 0.05 --  --  -0.56 0.07 
# loans  101,902 101,902 101,902 101,902 
Log Likelihood  261,109 259,611 260,156 258,234 
Note:  1 α  and  2 α  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.   1 θ  and  2 θ  are 
heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass 
point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.34 
(0.36) and p2=0.66 (0.64) for polynomial (PSA) baseline specification.
  28Table 6: Results for Hybrid 2/28 Rate Loans – Prepay 
   Polynomial baseline  PSA baseline 










Parameter Coef.  Std.  Err.  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
fico  0.11 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.01 
cltv  -0.22 0.01  -0.30 0.01  -0.18 0.01  -0.30 0.01 
lndoc  -0.07 0.01  -0.04 0.02  -0.05 0.01  -0.07 0.02 
ppen  -0.67 0.01  -0.80 0.01  -0.66 0.01  -0.77 0.01 
pmtshock  0.01 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.01 
adjust  0.41 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.28 0.02 
aftadj  -0.20 0.02  -0.60 0.03  -0.39 0.01  -0.43 0.02 
shock_adj  -0.29 0.03  -0.94 0.03  -0.26 0.03  -0.88 0.03 
shock_equity  0.62 0.06 0.49 0.07 0.62 0.06 0.49 0.07 
spread  0.06 0.01  -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01  -0.04 0.01 
unemp  -0.02 0.00  -0.02 0.01  -0.03 0.00  -0.02 0.01 
varindex  -0.04 0.01  -0.03 0.01  -0.02 0.01  -0.03 0.01 
varhpi  0.14 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.01 
1 α   0.86  0.01  1.05  0.01  -- --  -- -- 
2 α   -0.26  0.00  -0.18  0.00  -- --  -- -- 
1 θ   -3.36 0.01  -2.81 0.02 2.67 0.01 3.19 0.02 
2 θ   --  --  -4.73 0.04 --  --  1.56 0.04 
q1  -- --  0.00    -- --  0.00   
q2  --  --  -0.67 0.05 --  --  -0.56 0.07 
# loans  101,902 101,902 101,902 101,902 
Log Likelihood  261,109 259,611 260,156 258,234 
Note:  1 α  and  2 α  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.   1 θ  and  2 θ  are 
heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass 
point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.34 
(0.36) and p2=0.66 (0.64) for polynomial (PSA) baseline specification.
  29Table 7: Standardized Elasticity – FRM 
  
Polynomial 
baseline  PSA baseline 
Variable Default  Prepay Default Prepay 
fico  -56.3% 9.1%  -53.2% 9.1% 
cltv  70.4% -13.7%  66.4% -11.4% 
lndoc  46.5% 3.1%  37.2% 0.7% 
ppen  -6.2% -42.4%  5.1% -39.5% 
refi  14.0% 12.4% 14.3% 14.3% 
unemp  0.4% 5.1% 1.4% 6.6% 
varint  6.7% -3.7%  7.4% -3.2% 
varhpi  -7.1% 14.7%  -8.3% 14.6% 
Note: Elasticities are calculated using Models II and IV.  
Calculated as changes in predicted probabilities in response to 
a one-standard-deviation (0-to-1) change in the continuous 
(dummy) variables.  All other variables are evaluated at means. 
 
 
Table 8: Standardized Elasticity – Hybrid 2/28 
  
Polynomial 
baseline PSA  baseline 
Variable Default  Prepay Default Prepay 
fico  -31.4% 10.3%  -32.2% 13.7% 
cltv  23.7% -26.2%  30.0% -26.0% 
lndoc  43.4% -3.7% 44.4% -6.8% 
ppen  2.2% -54.9%  15.5% -53.7% 
pmtshock  27.9% 51.1% 23.6% 48.9% 
adjust  -9.9% 16.6%  7.0% 32.9% 
aftadj  -43.8% -44.9% -31.1% -35.2% 
shock_adj  -71.9% -60.8% -69.1% -58.6% 
shock_equity  89.4% 63.0% 89.5% 63.0% 
spread  3.6% -3.4%  3.3% -3.6% 
unemp  -2.0% -2.1% -1.9% -2.0% 
varindex  9.2% -3.1% 10.0% -2.7% 
varhpi  -10.9% 16.4%  -12.2% 16.4% 
Note: Elasticities are calculated, using Models II and IV.  
Calculated as changes in predicted probabilities in response 
to a one-standard-deviation (0-to-1) change in the continuous 
(dummy) variables.  All other variables are evaluated at 
means. 
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23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Age in Months
Baseline - no big payment shock (0.5%)
Big payment shock (>5%) at adjustment
Big payment shock and low equity (cltv>90%) at adjustment
First adjustment period Second adjustment period Fixed rate 
period
 
Probabilities normalized to one in the 23
rd month to aid comparison during adjustment period. 
 
  34Figure 9 







23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Age in Months
Baseline - no big payment shock (0.5%)
Big payment shock (>5%) at adjustment
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